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Occupational choice and the spirit of capitalism
Abstract
The British Industrial Revolution triggered a socioeconomic transformation whereby the landowning
aristocracy was replaced by industrial capitalists rising from the middle classes as the economically
dominant group. We propose a theory of preference formation under financial-market imperfections that
can account for this pattern. Parents shape their children's preferences in response to economic
incentives. Middleclass families in occupations requiring effort, skill, and experience develop patience
and work ethic, whereas upper-class families relying on rental income cultivate a refined taste for
leisure. These class-specific attitudes, which are rooted in the nature of pre-industrial professions,
become key determinants of success once industrialization transforms the economic landscape.
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The British Industrial Revolution triggered a socioeconomic transformation where-
by the landowning aristocracy was replaced by industrial capitalists rising from the
middle classes as the economically dominant group. We propose a theory of prefer-
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ﬁned taste for leisure. These class-speciﬁc attitudes, which are rooted in the nature of
pre-industrial professions, become key determinants of success once industrialization
transforms the economic landscape.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J24, N2, N3, O11, O15, O40.
Keywords: capitalism, endogenous preferences, industrial revolution, Max Weber,
occupational choice, patience, saving behavior, social classes, work ethic.
∗The authors would like to thank the editor, three anonymous referees, Daron Acemoglu, Philippe
Aghion, Robert Barro, Michele Boldrin, Francesco Caselli, Juan-Carlos Cordoba, Nicola Gennaioli, Hart-
mut Lehmann, Joel Mokyr, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Mar´ıa Sa´ez Mart´ı, Alan Taylor, Joachim Voth, and
the audiences at many seminar and conference presentations for helpful comments and suggestions. David
Lagakos and Andreas Mueller provided excellent research assistance, and Sally Gschwend provided valuable
editorial comments. Financial support by the National Science Foundation (grant SES-0217051), the Alfred
P. Sloan Foundation, NCCR-FINRISK, the Research Priority Program on Finance and Financial Markets
of the University of Zurich, and the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
Corresponding author: Matthias Doepke: Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles,
405 Hilgard Ave, Los Angeles, CA 90095 (e-mail: doepke@econ.ucla.edu).
I Introduction
The Industrial Revolution was more than capital accumulation and growth. It also set
oﬀ a social and political transformation that redeﬁned hierarchies in society and reshaped
the distribution of income and wealth. Before the onset of industrialization in eighteenth-
century Britain, wealth and political power were associated with the possession of land.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, a new class of entrepreneurs and businessmen
emerged as the economic elite. For the most part, the members of this class rose from
humble beginnings and had their social origin in the urban middle classes. The landed elite
was left behind, and eventually lost its political and economic predominance.
Many observers of the time linked this reversal in economic fortunes to diﬀerences in
values, attitudes, and ultimately preferences across social classes. There are countless ex-
amples, both in scholarly and ﬁctional writing, of portrayals of members of the landowning
class as averse to work, unwilling to save, ill-disposed to commercial activity, and unable to
consider money as something to be proﬁtably invested. In contrast, the new industrialists
are described as frugal, thrifty, and hard-working.1
The role of values and culture as determinants of socioeconomic change is the subject of
a long-standing debate in the social sciences. Karl Marx regarded economic relationships
as the “base of society,” and viewed culture, religion and ideology (the “superstructure”) as
mere reﬂections of the material interests of the class in control of the means of production.
Max Weber reversed Marx’s perspective, and argued culture and religion to be key driving
forces in the development of modern capitalism.
In this paper, we develop a theory of preference formation that is rooted in the rational-
choice paradigm, and ask whether such a theory can help explain the socioeconomic trans-
formation that accompanied the Industrial Revolution. In our theory the link between
economic conditions and cultural values (or, more precisely, class-speciﬁc preferences) runs
both ways. On the one hand, diﬀerences in preferences across social classes are a key deter-
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minant of socioeconomic change. But on the other hand, these preferences and values are
themselves shaped by the economic conditions that the members of diﬀerent social classes
face.2 When applied to the Industrial Revolution, our theory predicts both the initial di-
vergence of preferences across social classes and the ensuing reversal of economic fortunes
as equilibrium outcomes.
We construct a model where altruistic parents strive to shape their children’s preferences
in a way that best ﬁts with their future material circumstances. We focus on two key aspects
of preferences: the rate of time preference (patience) and the taste for leisure (or, conversely,
work ethic). Parental investments in patience interact with the steepness of lifetime income
proﬁles. Lifetime earnings are relatively ﬂat in some professions, while high returns are
achieved only late in life in others, in particular those requiring the acquisition of skills. A
parent’s incentive for investing in a child’s patience increases in the steepness of the child’s
future income proﬁle. Conversely, a child endowed with high patience will be more likely
to enter professions entailing the accumulation of skill and, hence, the delay of material
rewards. Parental investments in their children’s taste for leisure hinge on the role of labor
eﬀort. Parents who expect their children to be wholly reliant on labor income will tend to
instill them with a strong work ethic, i.e., a tolerance for hard work and a reduced taste
for leisure. In contrast, parents who anticipate their children to be rentiers with ample
free time will teach them to appreciate reﬁned leisure activities, from performing classical
music to fox hunting.
The complementarities between patience and steep income proﬁles and between the
taste for leisure and low work eﬀort imply that, within a given dynasty, the choices of a
speciﬁc occupation and of preferences suitable for that occupation are mutually reinforcing
over time. As a consequence, even if the population is initially homogeneous, prefer-
ences gradually diverge across the members of diﬀerent occupations. Hence, the society
is endogenously stratiﬁed into “social classes” deﬁned by occupations and their associated
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preferences and values. The theory also implies that the cultural divergence across social
classes is related to ﬁnancial development. If people can borrow and lend in perfect credit
markets to smooth consumption, the link between occupational choices and consumption
proﬁles is severed. Thus, divergence in patience across classes only emerges when ﬁnancial
markets are shallow, while ﬁnancial development leads to more homogeneous societies. This
prediction accords with the broad observation that class diﬀerences are less accentuated in
modern industrial economies than in traditional societies.
The theory can account for the reversal in the economic fortunes of diﬀerent social
classes at the time of the Industrial Revolution. For centuries, members of the pre-industrial
middle class—artisans, craftsmen, and merchants—had to sacriﬁce consumption and leisure
in their youths to acquire skills. In response to this economic environment, the middle class
developed a system of preferences and values centered around parsimony, work ethic, and
delay of gratiﬁcation. For the landed upper class, in contrast, neither work ethic nor
patience were particularly valuable, because the members of this class could rely on fairly
stable rental incomes from their estates. As a result, the landowning elite cultivated reﬁned
tastes for leisure and grew less future-oriented. In an otherwise stationary society, such
diﬀerences in preferences and values had limited consequences. However, patience and
work ethic became key assets—a “spirit of capitalism”—when opportunities of economic
advancement through entrepreneurship and investment arose at the outset of the Industrial
Revolution. In an already stratiﬁed society, it was members of the patient, hard-working
middle class who made the most of the new opportunities and ultimately gained economic
ascendency over the landed elite.
While the theory predicts the triumph of the thrifty and hard-working bourgeoisie at
the outset of the Industrial Revolution, it also implies that this success carries the seed
of its own destruction. Whereas ﬁrst-generation entrepreneurs started out poor, their
descendants inherited the family business. The founders’ children and grandchildren could
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thus rely on considerable capital income, making them less dependent on their own labor
income. Just as for the landowners, this creates an incentive to invest in the appreciation
of leisure: the industrial dynasties ultimately mimic the tastes of the old elite. In the
extreme, this eﬀect can lead to the downfall of a dynasty (the “Buddenbrooks” eﬀect); at
a minimum, the descendants will achieve less growth than the founders.
Our theory is consistent with a number of observations on the social history of Britain.
For instance, well before industrialization, members of the upper class displayed a low
propensity to save and accumulated debt, which suggests low patience. In addition, atti-
tudes to work and leisure diverged over time between the pre-industrial upper and middle
class. The perhaps most telling observation is that once economic success was achieved
after the Industrial Revolution, the traditional middle-class work ethic gave way to an in-
creased taste for leisure and an imitation of upper-class habits. This gentriﬁcation process
ultimately lowered class barriers to the point where intermarriage between members of
aristocratic and industrial dynasties became common fare.
Although we do not focus explicitly on religion, our theory is related to Weber’s view
that the spirit of capitalism was linked to the values of the Protestant Reformation. Protes-
tant values, and especially Puritanism, were widespread among the urban upper-middle
classes and may have been instrumental in their economic advancement. According to our
theory, Puritanism was successful among these groups precisely because its values were
compatible with the economic conditions faced by these groups. The same theory suggests
that changing economic conditions should aﬀect the success and popularity of religion. In
line with this prediction, religious fervor among the middle classes declined in the late
nineteenth century at the same time when the middle-class work ethic started to wane.3
In the following section, we relate our work to the existing literature. In Section III we
analyze the decision problem at the heart of our theory in partial equilibrium. In Section IV,
we embed the choice problem into a general-equilibrium model of a pre-industrial economy
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and discuss the evolution of the economy throughout the Industrial Revolution. Historical
evidence and alternative theories are discussed in Sections V and VI, and Section VII
concludes. All proofs are contained in the mathematical appendix, which is available
online.
II Related Literature
Our work contributes to the recent literature on the economics of the Industrial Revolu-
tion (see Galor and Weil [2000], Hansen and Prescott [2002], Doepke [2004], and Clark
[2007]). As we do, Clark views changing values and preferences as a key element of the
transition from a Malthusian era to a modern society: “As a whole these changes show
societies becoming increasingly middle class in their orientation. Thrift, prudence, negoti-
ation and hard work were imbuing themselves into communities that had been spendthrift,
violent, impulsive and leisure loving.” [Clark, 2007, p. 208]. However, following Galor and
Moav [2002], Clark emphasizes genetic selection rather than conscious investment as the
mechanism for preference formation (see also Clark and Hamilton [2006] and Galor and
Michalopoulos [2006]). We view selection and investment in preferences as complementary
approaches, because they operate on diﬀerent time scales and lead to distinct implications.
The evolutionary literature is concerned with changes in the composition of genetic traits
that aﬀect entire populations and take place over long time horizons. Galor and Moav
[2002], for instance, argue that selection pressures which generated preferences favorable
for economic growth have been operating at least since the Neolithic Revolution nearly
10,000 years ago. In contrast, our focus is on the divergence of preferences across social
classes, and our mechanism operates at a time scale from two or three generations (the
“Buddenbrooks” eﬀect) to at most a few centuries.
Our paper provides a new perspective of the eﬀects of wealth inequality on development
in the face of ﬁnancial market imperfections. A number of existing theories point out
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that if ﬁnancial markets are absent, poor individuals may be unable to ﬁnance otherwise
proﬁtable investment projects, and are therefore forced to enter less productive professions
(see Banerjee and Newman [1993], Galor and Zeira [1993], Bertocchi [2006], and Matsuyama
[2006]). A common feature of this literature is that the rich, who are least constrained
by credit market imperfections, generally do best and are the ﬁrst beneﬁciaries of new
investment opportunities. Therefore, these theories cannot explain how a new class of
entrepreneurs rose from humble beginnings to leapfrog over the landed pre-industrial elite,
at a time when wealth inequality was quite extreme and ﬁnancial markets shallow by
modern standards.
Our theory is also related to a recent literature on the eﬀects of religious values on
economic performance and the income distribution. Using international survey data, Barro
and McCleary [2003] ﬁnd that economic growth responds positively to the beliefs in hell
and heaven. One interpretation of this ﬁnding is that a habit of contemplating the distant
future generates individual behavior favorable for economic performance. Similar ﬁndings
are documented by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales [2003].4 In a diﬀerent vein, Botticini and
Eckstein [2005, 2006, and 2007] argue that Jews originally specialized in artisanship, trade,
and ﬁnance because of religious reforms that fostered literacy among Jewish farmers. After
the reforms, Jews progressively migrated to towns to exploit their comparative advantage
in education in skilled urban occupations. Thus, as in our theory, group-speciﬁc values and
attitudes have long-lasting eﬀects on economic decisions. However, the impetus in Botticini
and Eckstein is a cultural shock to a particular group (a reform in the Jewish religion), while
our mechanism relies on economic incentives faced by an initially homogeneous population.
Turning more speciﬁcally to Weber’s hypothesis, Becker and Woessmann [2007] ﬁnd that in
nineteenth-century Prussia Protestant counties were more prosperous than Catholic ones.
However, the eﬀect of religion disappears when one controls for education, suggesting that
values aﬀect economic performance mainly through the accumulation of human capital.
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Although we do not model religion explicitly, our theory is consistent with this view.
The notion of patience as an asset that agents can invest in was ﬁrst introduced in
the economic literature by Becker and Mulligan [1997], who consider the problem of a
consumer who lives for a ﬁnite number of periods and makes a one-time choice of a discount
factor. In contrast, we embed the choice of patience in a dynamic model of preference
formation with the additional dimensions of choosing an occupation and investing into the
taste for leisure.5 An alternative mechanism of preference transmission is advocated by
the literature on cultural transmission (see Bisin and Verdier [2001], Hauk and Saez-Marti
[2002], Ferna´ndez, Fogli, and Olivetti [2004], Saez-Marti and Zenou [2006], Gradstein [2007],
Saez-Marti and Sjoegren [2007], and Tabellini [2007]). As in our work, parents’ incentives
for forming their children’s preferences depend on economic conditions. However, parents
invest because they desire to make their children’s behavior conform with their own wishes.
In our dynastic model, parents judge their children’s choices solely through the children’s
own eyes: preference formation is a gift that altruistic parents pass on to their children.
If patience and the work ethic are accumulated and transmitted within dynasties, par-
ents’ and children’s propensities to save and invest should be positively correlated. This
implication is conﬁrmed by Knowles and Postlewaite [2005], who show that in the PSID
parental savings behavior is an important determinant of their children’s education and sav-
ings choices, after controlling for a variety of individual characteristics (see also Charles and
Hurst [2003], who study the correlation of wealth between parents and children). Moreover,
the correlation is stronger between children and mothers, who are usually more involved
in a in child’s upbringing than fathers. Our theory also posits that agents with steeper
income proﬁles are more patient. This is consistent with the results of a ﬁeld experiment
conducted on Danish households by Harrison, Lau, and Williams [2002] showing that time
discount rates of highly educated adults (who tend to have steeper income proﬁles) are
about one third lower than those of adults with less education.6
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Reyes-Garcia et al. [2007] study the eﬀect of patience on economic outcomes among the
Tsimanes, an Amazonian tribal society that only recently transitioned from self-suﬃciency
to a market economy. They ﬁnd that more patient individuals were subsequently more
likely to acquire formal education, choose market-oriented occupations, and earn higher
income (see also Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez [1992]). A recent empirical literature
highlights the role of a broader set of non-cognitive skills, including both patience and
work ethic, for economic performance (see Heckman and Rubinstein [2001], Segal [2006],
and Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua [2006]). Coleman and Hoﬀer [1983] argue that the
emphasis on patience and self-discipline is the key to the eﬀectiveness of Catholic schools
in the United States. This literature also shows that non-cognitive skills depend on nurture
and family upbringing.7
III A Model of Occupational Choice and Endogenous Preference
Formation
In this section, we develop a theory of endogenous preference formation that is driven
by parents’ desire to instill certain tastes into their children. We concentrate on two
dimensions of preferences, the taste for leisure and patience. Investments in the taste
for leisure comprise all parental eﬀorts that cultivate a child’s ability to enjoy free (non-
working) time. Examples are teaching one’s child to swim, to play a sport, to ride a horse,
or to play a musical instrument. Since a high appreciation of leisure raises the opportunity
cost of working, parental eﬀorts in the opposite direction (those that lower the taste for
leisure) can be interpreted as increasing a child’s tolerance for hard work. Parents may
achieve this objective by preaching the virtues of an austere life.8 Investments in patience
determine the weight that a child attaches, in adult age, to utility late in life relative
to the present. Instilling parsimony and thrift into children are examples of this type of
investment. Religious ideas stressing the value of frugality and industry—the “Protestant
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Ethic” of Max Weber—can also be regarded as vehicles for the accumulation of patience
and the work ethic.
In the theory, the parents’ investments in their children’s preferences respond to eco-
nomic incentives. As a consequence, preference formation interacts with other economic
decisions taken by both parent and child. Our particular focus is on the question of how
preferences both determine and depend on the choice of an occupation. With an eye to
our historical application, we separately analyze the decision problem of agents who rely
on wage income alone (such as workers or artisans) and agents who also receive rents (such
as landowners).
III.A Preferences, Timing, and Occupations
The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of altruistic people who live
for four periods, two as children and two as adults. People work throughout both adult
periods (young and old), and their earnings may vary over time. Agents consume and make
economic decisions only when they are adult. At the beginning of adulthood, every agent
gives birth to a single child.
All adults have the same basic preferences. However, two aspects of the preferences are
endogenous, namely patience (the relative weight of old versus young adult consumption in
utility) and the taste for leisure (the marginal utility of free time). These taste parameters
are determined during an agent’s childhood as a result of her parent’s child-rearing eﬀort
(i.e., investment in preferences). Once an agent reaches adulthood, preferences no longer
change. An adult therefore takes her own preferences as given, but gets to shape her child’s
tastes.
Agents are altruistic towards their children. In addition, their utility depends on con-
sumption, leisure, and investment in preferences in each of the two adult periods (see the
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time line in Figure I ). More formally, a young adult’s lifetime utility is given by:
(1) (1− B) (log (c1) + A (1− n1)− lA,1 − lB,1) + B (log (c2) + A (1− n2)− lA,2 − lB,2)
+ z Vchild(A
′(lA, A), B′(lB, B)).
Here A denotes the taste for leisure, and B denotes patience. The ﬁrst row of (1) is the
adult’s felicity: c1 and c2 denote consumption, n1 and n2 labor supply, and lA,1, lA,2, lB,1,
and lB,2 the eﬀort choices for investing in the child’s taste for leisure and patience. To
simplify the analysis, we assume that the investments in preferences are only productive
if sustained at the same level over the two adult periods. Thus, lA,1 = lA,2 = lA and
lB,1 = lB,2 = lB. The second row of (1) is the altruistic component: Vchild represents the
child’s maximized utility as a function of its preference parameters, as chosen by the parent.
A′(lA, A) and B′(lB, B) are the “production functions” for the child’s preferences, which
take the form:
A′(lA, A) = ψA¯ + (1− ψ)A + g(lA),(2)
B′(lB, B) = ψB¯ + (1− ψ)B + f(lB),(3)
where ψ ∈ (0, 1] is a constant depreciation rate and f and g are non-negative increasing
functions. A¯ > 0 and B¯ > 0 represent the innate levels of the taste for leisure and patience,
i.e., the steady states of A and B in the absence of any investment. The intergenerational
persistence of preferences captures the notion that, to some extent, children learn by imi-
tating parental attitudes. Thus, part of the parents’ preferences are transmitted eﬀortlessly
to the child. The parental eﬀort is bounded, lA ∈ [0, l¯A] and lB ∈ [0, l¯B]. Also, we nor-
malize the time endowment to unity, n1 ∈ [0, 1] and n2 ∈ [0, 1], and impose the following
restrictions.
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Assumption 1. The function f : [0, l¯B]→ R+ is continuous, strictly increasing, and weakly
concave, and g : [0, l¯A] → R+ is continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly concave.
Moreover, g(0) = f(0) = 0 and f(l¯B) ≤ ψ
(
1− B¯). The parameters z and ψ satisfy
0 < z < 1 and 0 < ψ < 1.
The assumptions imply the upper bounds for the preference parameters Amax ≡ A¯ +
g(l¯A)/ψ and Bmax ≡ B¯ + f(l¯B)/ψ ≤ 1.
III.B Wage Earners
We ﬁrst describe outcomes for agents who rely exclusively on labor income. In our historical
application this will correspond to the landless classes, such as workers and artisans. In
addition to choosing labor supply and investing in preferences, these agents choose an
occupation. An occupation i is characterized by a wage (or labor productivity) proﬁle
{w1,i, w2,i}, where w1,i and w2,i are strictly positive and w2,i ≥ w1,i, due to a premium to
experience and human capital. There is a ﬁnite number I of occupations to choose from.
Occupations are indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I}, and ordered according to the steepness of
the wage proﬁle. Without loss of generality, we ignore occupations featuring a dominated
proﬁle.
Assumption 2. The productivity proﬁles satisfy w2,i ≥ w1,i > 0 for all i. Moreover, a
higher index denotes a steeper productivity proﬁle, i.e., j > i implies w1,j < w1,i and
w2,j > w2,i.
Since parents are altruistic towards their children and preferences are time consistent,
the decision problem can be given a dynastic interpretation, where the head of the dynasty
makes decisions for all subsequent generations.9 In this section, we analyze the problem
in partial equilibrium, taking the productivity proﬁles {w1,i, w2,i} as exogenous and time
invariant. In Section IV, we will extend the analysis to a general-equilibrium economy
where the wage proﬁles are endogenously determined.
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The development of ﬁnancial markets plays an important role in our analysis. For now,
we assume that ﬁnancial markets are absent, i.e., households cannot borrow or lend to
smooth out consumption. Hence, consumption is equal to income in each period, c1 = w1,in1
and c2 = w2,in2, and the preference parameters A and B are the only state variables for a
dynasty. Later on, we will discuss the eﬀects of ﬁnancial development.
A young adult’s choice problem can be represented by the following Bellman equation:
(4) V (A,B) = max
i∈I,lA,lB,n1,n2
{
(1−B) (log(w1,in1) + A(1− n1))
+ B (log(w2,in2) + A(1− n2))− lA − lB + z V (A′, B′)
}
subject to (2) and (3). Our decision problem is a dynamic programming problem with
two state variables on the compact state space [A¯, Amax] × [B¯, Bmax]. Standard recursive
arguments imply that the Bellman equation (4) has a unique solution. Since A is constant
over an individual’s life, the optimal choice of labor supply in (4) is constant as well, i.e.,
n1 = n2 = n. This observation leads to a useful result: the problems of investing in patience
and in the taste for leisure are separable.
Lemma 1. The value function V is additively separable in its arguments, V (A,B) =
vA (A) + vB (B) where:
vA(A) = max
lA,n
{log(n) + A(1− n)− lA + z vA(A′)} ,(5)
vB(B) = max
i∈I,lB
{(1− B) log(w1,i) + B log(w2,i)− lB + z vB(B′)} ,(6)
subject to, respectively, (2) and (3).
Lemma 1 implies that as long as wages are the only source of income, the occupational
choice does not interact with the investment in the taste for leisure, so that we can analyze
the problems of investing in patience and in the taste for leisure separately.10 We start by
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characterizing the value function vB(B), which reﬂects both the investment in patience and
the choice of an occupation. The policy function for the investment in patience is denoted
lB (B).
Proposition 1. The value function vB is non-decreasing, convex, and piece-wise linear. The
steepness of the optimal wage proﬁle, w2,i/w1,i, is non-decreasing in B, and the optimal
investment in patience lB = lB (B) is non-decreasing in B. Over the interior of any
interval for B on which vB is linear, the occupational choice of each member of the
dynasty (i.e., parent, child, grandchild and so on) is constant and unique (though possi-
bly diﬀerent across generations), and lB(B) is constant and generically single-valued.
Each kink in the value function corresponds to a switch to an occupation with a steeper
income proﬁle by a present or future member of the dynasty. At a kink, the optimal
choices of occupation and lB corresponding to both adjoining intervals are optimal.
Thus, the optimal policy function is a non-decreasing step function, which takes multiple
values only at a step.
The value and policy functions are visualized in Figure II . That vB is non-decreasing
follows from the assumption that the wage proﬁle is non-decreasing. In particular, if for
suﬃciently low patience all members of a dynasty choose an occupation with a ﬂat income
proﬁle (w1 = w2), the value function is constant in that range. This corresponds to the
interval [B¯, B1] in Figure II . Within this range, the value function is ﬂat (upper panel), and
agents do not invest in patience (lower panel). As soon as B is suﬃciently large (B > B1), a
current or future member of the dynasty ﬁnds choosing a profession with w2 > w1 optimal,
and the value function becomes strictly increasing in B.
The convexity of vB follows from a complementarity between patience and the choice
of steep income proﬁles. To gain intuition, consider ﬁrst the decision problem without
an occupational choice, that is, with a ﬁxed occupation {w1, w2}. If we vary the initial
generation’s B while holding the investment choice lB constant over all generations, utility
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is a linear function of B (as depicted by the dotted line in the upper panel of Figure II ).
Moreover, given the ﬁxed income proﬁle, choosing a constant lB is optimal: the marginal
return to investing in patience in a given period is given by z log(w2/w1), which does not
depend on B. Generalizing from this observation, the value function is linear over any
range of B such that it is optimal for the current and future members of a dynasty to
hold the occupational choice constant. In general, however, occupational choices are not
ﬁxed. Given that B is the relative weight on utility late in life, it is optimal to choose an
occupation with a steep wage proﬁle (large i) when B is high, and one yielding a ﬂat proﬁle
when B is low. As we increase B, the slope of the value function increases discretely every
time either a current or a future member of the dynasty ﬁnds switching into a profession
with a steeper proﬁle optimal, resulting in a convex value function.
In the upper panel of Figure II , the true value function is represented by the solid
line; the points B1 and B2 are thresholds where either the current or a future occupation
changes. At each of the kinks, some member of the dynasty is indiﬀerent between (at least)
two diﬀerent proﬁles. As depicted in the lower panel of Figure II , the optimal lB increases
at each step, because the marginal beneﬁt of being patient increases with the steepness of
the wage proﬁle. Since the choice of lB depends on the chosen income proﬁle, there may
be multiple optimal choices of lB at a B where the value function has a kink, whereas in
between kinks the optimal choice of lB is unique.
Proposition 1 allows us to characterize the equilibrium law of motion for patience. Since
the policy correspondence lB (B) is monotone, the dynamics of B are also monotone and
converge to a steady state from any initial condition.11
Proposition 2. The law of motion of patience capital is described by the following diﬀerence
equation:
B′ = ψB¯ + (1− ψ)B + f (lB (B)) ,
where lB (B) is a non-decreasing step function (as described in Proposition 1). Generi-
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cally, for any initial condition B0 the dynasty converges to a steady state with constant
B where parents and children choose the same profession. The steady-state levels of
B and lB are increasing in the steepness of the steady-state income proﬁle. Multiple
steady states are possible.
Since Bt converges to a steady state, there must be a time T such that the occupational
choice of all members of a dynasty is constant from T onwards. The dynamics of B are
particularly simple once the occupational choice is constant. Since the law of motion is
given by Bt+1 = ψB¯ + (1 − ψ)Bt + f(lssB ), patience converges to a steady state given by
Bss = B¯+f(lssB )/ψ. However, the steady state does not have to be unique, even for a given
B0. For example, if the initial generation is indiﬀerent between two diﬀerent occupations,
the steady state can depend on which one is chosen.
So far, we have established that members of diﬀerent professions face diﬀerent incen-
tives for investing in patience, provided that the steepness of income proﬁles diﬀers across
professions. A key assumption underlying this result is that access to ﬁnancial markets is
limited. The incentive to invest in patience is determined not by the income proﬁle per
se, but by the lifetime proﬁle of period-by-period utilities. If agents were able to borrow
and lend within each cohort at a ﬁxed interest rate, the interaction of patience and occu-
pational choices would be severed: ﬁrst, only occupations maximizing the present value of
the lifetime wage proﬁle would be chosen in equilibrium; second, since the household could
freely allocate income among the two adult periods, the choice of a profession would have
no bearing on the incentives to invest in patience. Put diﬀerently, at least some ﬁnancial
market imperfections are necessary for occupational choice and investments in patience to
be interlinked.12
A positive implication of this ﬁnding is that the degree of preference heterogeneity in a
population depends on the development of ﬁnancial markets. In an economy where ﬁnancial
markets are mostly absent, incentives to invest in patience vary widely across members of
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diﬀerent professions, and consequently we would expect to observe a large corresponding
variation in actual acquired preferences. These diﬀerences should be smaller in modern
economies with less imperfect ﬁnancial markets.13
Consider, next, the problem of investing in the taste for leisure, as described by the
maximization problem (5). The following proposition characterizes the value and policy
functions vA(A) and lA(A).
Proposition 3. The value function vA is non-decreasing and convex. Optimal labor supply
is given by:
(7) n = min{A−1, 1}.
The optimal investment in taste for leisure, lA = lA (A) is non-decreasing in A.
More speciﬁcally, the value function is strictly increasing over any range of A where
leisure is positive, i.e., n < 1 or, given (7), A > 1. The convexity of the value function is
once again due to a complementarity between preferences and economic decisions beﬁtting
these preferences. The value function would be linear in A if people could not adjust
their labor supply when A changes. However, people do adjust n (they work less when A
increases), and the value function is thus convex. Unlike the choice of an occupation, n is
a continuous variable, implying that the value function is strictly convex, except in ranges
where n is at a corner. The characterization of vA leads to the following results regarding
the equilibrium law of motion.
Proposition 4. The law of motion of the taste for leisure is described by the following
diﬀerence equation:
A′ = ψA¯ + (1− ψ)A + g (lA (A)) .
Given an initial condition A0 the dynasty converges monotonically to a steady state
with constant A.
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Multiple steady states are possible, depending on the parameterization of g. However,
cross-dynasty diﬀerences in the taste for leisure can only arise from diﬀerences in initial
conditions. If all dynasties start with the same A, they remain identical along this prefer-
ence dimension. The incentive to invest into the taste for leisure depends entirely on the
amount of leisure enjoyed by future members of the dynasty.
III.C Rentiers
We now consider the choice problem for agents earning rents. In our historical analysis,
this will correspond to the landowners. Unlike the landless wage earners, the landowners
in our economy will not have to choose an occupation, because their income is provided
by inherited land. However, they still have to make decisions on patience and the taste for
leisure.
We denote the rent accruing per unit of land by r, and the amount of land owned by a
given landowner by x. In order to appropriate the entire rent, landowners have to monitor
the workers on their land. The landowners’ budget constraints are
c1 = rx + (r − r) xn1 and c2 = rx + (r − r)xn2,
where n1 and n2 denote the monitoring eﬀort (in units of time) in the two periods. Even
without monitoring (the proverbial “absent landlord”), the landowner earns a minimum
return r < r on the land. By setting n = 1, landowners can appropriate the entire rent.
Enjoying leisure entails a linear income loss. The return to monitoring is a reduced-form
representation of moral hazard problems, such as the possibility that administrators steal
a part of the rent. The key feature of this income process is that total income is less elastic
with respect to labor eﬀort than the income of pure wage earners.
Since the income proﬁle is ﬂat, optimal labor supply is constant, and the value function
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is independent of B. Thus, landowners do not invest in patience, and their investment and
labor supply problem can be written as:
(8) V L(A,B) = vLA(A) = max
lA,n
{(log(rx + (r − r)xn) + A(1− n))− lA + z vLA(A′)},
subject to (2).
Proposition 5. The value function vLA is non-decreasing and convex. Optimal labor supply
is given by
(9) n = max
{
min
{
A−1 − r
r − r , 1
}
, 0
}
.
The optimal investment in taste for leisure, lA = l
L
A (A) is non-decreasing in A. Given
an initial condition A0 the dynasty converges monotonically to a steady state with
constant A, which is higher than the steady-state A for pure wage earners (as described
in Proposition 4).
These results are parallel to Propositions 3 and 4, except that for a given A labor
supply is lower than in the case of pure wage income, and decreasing in the ratio of the
pure rent to the return to eﬀort. This feeds back into the investment decision: parents
whose children have more time for leisure invest more in the children’s taste for leisure.
Note that the incentives for landowners to supply labor and invest in the taste for leisure
do not depend on the size of their estate, x: in steady state the entire class of landowners
will have identical preferences. Over time, landowning dynasties earning rents will develop
a higher taste for leisure (i.e., a lower work ethic) than dynasties relying on labor income
only.
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IV Preference Formation and the Industrial Revolution
In this section, we apply our theory to the evolution of preferences across social classes
before and after the Industrial Revolution. As a ﬁrst step, we embed our theory of pref-
erence formation into a general-equilibrium model of a pre-industrial economy. We show
that even if everyone initially has the same preferences, general-equilibrium forces can lead
to a stratiﬁcation of society and divergence of preferences across social classes. Then, we
explore how the economy evolves once the Industrial Revolution arrives in the form of new
opportunities for investment and entrepreneurship.
IV.A The Pre-industrial Equilibrium
In the analysis of the previous section, the level of income derived in each profession has
been taken as exogenous. We now endogenize wages and rental rates by constructing a
simple general-equilibrium model of a pre-industrial economy characterized by two modes
of production: agriculture and artisanship. Agricultural output, YF , and the artisans’
production, YM , are perfect substitutes, so that total output is given by Y = YF + YM .
The two technologies diﬀer in terms of the inputs used. The agricultural technology uses
unskilled labor L and land Z, and is described by the following production function:
(10) YF = L
αZ1−α,
where α ∈ (0, 1). The artisan technology is linear in skilled labor H :
(11) YM = qH,
where q is a productivity parameter. Both sectors are competitive, so that factors are paid
their marginal product. The total amount of land is ﬁxed at Z = 1. Land is not traded
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and is owned by a ﬁxed measure of dynasties, each of whom owns an equal share x of land.
The rents accruing to landowners depends on x and on their monitoring eﬀort as discussed
in the previous section. Each landowner bequeaths the land he owns to his child when he
passes away. There is no occupational mobility between landowners and the other classes.
The mass of landless labor-market participants (workers and artisans) is equal to one in
every period.
The main diﬀerence between skilled and unskilled labor is the lifetime income proﬁle.
Recall that in equilibrium, all individuals relying only on labor income supply the same
amount of labor n in both periods of their lives. An unskilled worker is equally eﬃcient
at young and at old age, and therefore supplies an equal number n of eﬃciency units of
unskilled labor in both adult periods. Skilled workers (i.e., artisans), in contrast, use some
of the young adult period to acquire skills and experience. Their eﬀective labor supply is
given by n eﬃciency units of skilled labor in the ﬁrst adult period and by γn units in the
second adult period, where γ > 1. Hence, artisans have a steep lifetime income proﬁle,
whereas the workers’ proﬁle is ﬂat.
Suppose that initially the productivity q of artisanship is so low that only the agricul-
tural technology is used. As a consequence, all landless agents are workers with ﬂat income
proﬁles. Patience is not a valuable asset in such an economy, and remains at the natural
level B¯. At this stage, all landless agents have the same preferences. Now consider the
transition of the economy once the productivity of artisanship q increases unexpectedly. If
the increase is suﬃciently large, all workers remaining in agriculture is no longer an equi-
librium. Thus, wages will adjust in general equilibrium to make everyone just indiﬀerent
between being a worker and being an artisan, and adults will endogenously divide between
the two occupations.
Once the initial sorting of the landless agents into workers and artisans has taken
place, stratiﬁcation in preferences across social classes necessarily follows. In general, the
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transition can be complicated if the fractions of workers and artisans (and hence wages)
change over time. Here we focus on equilibria such that, after the initial sorting, the
number of workers and artisans remains constant and the wages are time invariant.14 More
formally, let μ be the aggregate labor supply in agriculture (that is, the fraction of workers
among the landless adults multiplied by individual labor supply) after the sorting. Workers
then earn a wage equal to wF = αμ
α−1 in both periods, whereas artisans earn q in the ﬁrst
and γq in the second period. If wF is constant over time, the analysis of the preceding
section applies directly to the decision problem in the general-equilibrium economy.15
The main feature of this equilibrium is that occupational sorting triggers divergence in
patience across worker and artisan dynasties, even though in the ﬁrst generation everyone
has the same preferences. Given their steep income proﬁles, from the second generation
onwards all members of the artisan dynasties are more patient than workers and strictly
prefer to be artisans. In contrast, the taste for leisure is not aﬀected by the occupational
choice, because the members of both occupations continue to rely exclusively on labor in-
come. Thus, the theory predicts no sorting across workers and artisans along this dimension
of preferences, and both groups continue to work the same number of hours.16 Land rents
are constant in the equilibrium, so that landowners have a ﬂat income proﬁle and do not
invest in patience. However, landowners invest more than artisans and workers in the taste
for leisure, implying that their taste for leisure converges to a higher steady state.
To summarize, the members of the three occupations in our pre-industrial economy
all end up with diﬀerent preferences, shaped in each case by the economic conditions
characterizing the profession. Both workers and artisans are hard-working, because they
rely exclusively on labor income. Artisans are more patient than workers, however, since
they face a steep lifetime income proﬁle. The landowners face an income proﬁle that is
equally ﬂat as that of the workers, and they consequently have the same low patience.
Unlike the workers, the landowners derive their income mostly from land instead of labor.
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As a consequence, the landowners develop a higher taste for leisure (or conversely a greater
aversion to work) than the landless classes. In the pre-industrial economy, this stratiﬁcation
of preferences is only important to the extent that it determines occupational choices. We
now turn to the question how the fate of the diﬀerent classes in our economy evolves when
technological change alters the economic landscape.
IV.B From Artisan to Capitalist
We model industrialization by introducing a new technology that increases the productiv-
ity of savings and investments. The new technology becomes unexpectedly available after
preferences have already diverged across classes. The class-speciﬁc preferences, which were
formed in response to economic conditions in the pre-industrial period, also turn out to
determine the extent to which members of diﬀerent classes make use of the new technol-
ogy. The basic result is unsurprising in the light of standard economic theory: the most
patient and hardest-working classes, i.e., the artisans, are the ﬁrst to take advantage of the
new opportunity—they possess the “spirit of capitalism.” The artisans leapfrog over the
landowning class, and replace them as the economic elite. However, preferences continue
to evolve after the introduction of the new technology. To some extent, this process can
mitigate the subsequent divergence of wealth across classes. In particular, as the new in-
dustrialists accumulate wealth, they also start accumulating a taste for leisure. As a result,
the children and grandchildren of the ﬁrst industrialists are less economically successful
than the founding generation.
After the introduction of the new technology, each dynasty faces a decision problem
with three state variables: leisure taste A, patience B, and capital K. We interpret the
capital variable as a family-owned enterprise. Young adults decide how much of their ﬁrst-
period income to consume and how much to invest into the family business. Investments
in the business are assumed to be irreversible: agents can consume the output of the
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investment technology (as well as their labor and land-rent income), but the capital stock
itself cannot be liquidated and turned into consumption. The capital owned by an old
agent is bequeathed—up to depreciation—to her child.17 We continue to assume that
agents cannot borrow.
The capital stock of the family business depreciates at the rate δ. The rate of return
on capital depends on labor eﬀort and is denoted by R(n). Here the return is increasing
in n, i.e., a hard-working entrepreneur earns a higher return than a passive owner. This
captures the role of managerial eﬀort and monitoring in a business and is parallel to our
treatment of rental income from land. The return is given by:
R(n) = R + (R−R)nη,
where R > R > 0 and 0 < η < 1.18 We also assume that the business activity is run in
addition to one of the existing professions. Thus, a young entrepreneur can derive additional
labor income as a worker or artisan, or in the case of landowners, entrepreneurship can
be combined with rental income from land. This feature, together with the absence of
any ﬁxed cost, allows businesses to be started at a small scale on top of other activities.
In particular, we want to allow aristocrats to earn rents from their land and invest the
proceeds in a capital market, so as to not exclude them from investment from the outset.
For simplicity, we assume that a single eﬀort choice determines labor or rental income as
well as the return on the family business (separating these choice variables would complicate
the notation without changing the main results).
Let K ≥ 0 denote the bequest of capital received by a young adult. The budget
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constraints and the irreversibility constraint are given by:
c1 + K
′ = (1− δ + R(n1,i))K + y1,(12)
c2 = R(n2,i)K
′ + y2,(13)
K ′ ≥ (1− δ)K.(14)
Here y1 and y2 denote income derived outside the family business. For workers and artisans,
this consists of labor income (y1 = w1,in1,i and y2 = w2,in2,i), whereas aristocrats receive
the rents from their land x as a function of their monitoring eﬀort (y1 = rx + (r − r) xn1
and y2 = rx + (r − r) xn2). In the budget constraint (12) for the ﬁrst adult period, total
income consists of y1 plus capital income (1− δ +R(n1,i))K. Because of the irreversibility
constraint (14), consumption cannot exceed the sum of current output and labor income:
c1 ≤ R(n1,i)K. In the second-period budget constraint (13), the agent earns y2 plus capital
income R(n2,i)K
′. Since the capital stock cannot be liquidated, the agent bequeaths the
remaining capital (1− δ)K ′ to her child. 19
The recursive representation of the decision problem of a young adult with leisure
preference A, patience B, and inherited capital stock K is given by the following Bellman
equation:
V (A,B,K) = max
c1,c2,lA,lB ,n1,n2
{
(1−B) (log(c1) + A(1− n1)) + B (log(c2) + A(1− n2))
− lA − lB + z V (A′, B′, (1− δ)K ′)
}
where the maximization is subject to the laws of motion for A and B (2) and (3), and the
budget and irreversibility constraints (12), (13), and (14). Moreover, the choice variables
are bounded by c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ n1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ n2 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ lA ≤ l¯A, and 0 ≤ lB ≤ l¯B.
Capital investment aﬀects the incentives for investing in both preference parameters,
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implying that the separation result of Lemma 1 no longer holds and the equilibrium laws of
motion of A B and K are interdependent. This prevents a full analytical characterization,
and the model must be solved numerically. Nevertheless, the basic tradeoﬀs that determine
investment in preferences are still the same, so that, at least qualitatively, the interaction
of capital accumulation and preference formation is easily understood.
First, consider how preferences determine the investment choice. Here a standard Euler
equation applies: a young adult invests if future marginal utilities weighted by the ap-
propriate time discount factors and investment returns exceed the cost of investing, i.e.,
current marginal utility. Thus, more patient agents have a higher propensity to invest.
In addition, agents with a low taste for leisure also tend to invest more, since by working
harder they earn a higher return on their investment. If we apply these ﬁndings to our
economic environment, it follows that the artisans are, at least initially, the ideal investors,
because they are both patient and hard-working. The other classes either invest less (rela-
tive to their income) or not at all. The latter would occur if an agent preferred to borrow
rather than save at the rate of return provided by the investment technology.
Once a family has entered entrepreneurship, this will feed back into the further evo-
lution of preferences within the dynasty. Here the interactions with leisure preferences
and patience are opposites of each other. In the case of patience, the fact that a dynasty
starts investing will increase the investment in patience, which ampliﬁes the original drive
to invest. The reason is that investment endogenously steepens utility proﬁles both within
and across generations, i.e., utility drops during the early investment period and increases
in the later return periods.
However, this eﬀect will be mitigated or even reversed by the endogeneity of the taste for
leisure. The optimality conditions for labor supply and investing in leisure are unchanged;
thus, labor supply depends on leisure preference as well as the elasticity of consumption with
respect to labor eﬀort, and investment in the taste for leisure depends on future labor eﬀort.
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Initially, an artisan or worker dynasty entering entrepreneurship has little appreciation for
leisure and is therefore hard working, as historically these dynasties relied on labor income
alone. However, the descendants of the initial entrepreneurs inherit the family ﬁrm. Thus,
just as the landowners’, their consumption derives increasingly from capital income and
becomes less elastic with respect to labor eﬀort. As a consequence, the founders’ children
and grandchildren work less hard than their forefathers and develop the same ﬁne tastes
for leisure that the land-owning class already possesses. Of course, the drop in labor eﬀort
also lowers the return on investment, which can lead to a slowdown or even reversal in
accumulation. Thus, the model veriﬁes the “Carnegie conjecture:” the initial success of
a dynasty can lay the seed for its ultimate downfall. Whether this eﬀect dominates the
increased accumulation of patience depends on parameters. This “Buddenbrooks” eﬀect
will be particularly strong if investment in the taste for leisure is highly elastic and labor
eﬀort has a large eﬀect on entrepreneurial success, i.e., R −R is large.
We now provide a numerical illustration of the equilibrium dynamics of our model after
the introduction of a capitalist technology. Table I summarizes the parameter values used
for the simulation. The functional forms for investing in the taste for leisure and patience
are given by g(lA) = φAl
ξA
A and g(lB) = φBl
ξB
B . As described in Section IV, the economy
starts out under uniform preferences in the pre-industrial period long before the capitalist
technology becomes available. Then people sort into professions, and over time preferences
approach occupation-speciﬁc steady states. In this pre-industrial steady state, artisans
earn a wage of 1.0 in the ﬁrst and 2.0 in the second period, whereas workers earn a wage
of w ≈ 1.4 in each period.
Figure III displays the dynamics of capital and patience for members of the three
occupations. The economy is still in the pre-industrial steady state in period 0; in period
1, the capitalist technology is introduced unexpectedly. Given the return of the investment
technology, the workers continue not to invest in patience. The artisans, however, are
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suﬃciently patient to ﬁnd investment in capital attractive right away. Investment in capital
increases the incentive for investing in patience, so that both the artisan’s patience and
their growth rate of capital increase for a few periods.
Figure IV displays the dynamics of the taste for leisure during this transition. Once
again, for the workers nothing changes. In contrast, as the artisan-turned-capitalist dynas-
ties grow richer, their work ethic deteriorates. After a few periods, their taste for leisure is
just as reﬁned as that of the landowners. This contributes to a slow-down in their capital
accumulation.
Given that the workers do not invest, the landowners a fortiori do not do so either.
They have the same ﬂat income proﬁle (although possibly a higher income level) and the
same low patience as the workers, but additionally a higher appreciation for leisure. They
therefore continue to live oﬀ their land rents, and are soon overtaken by the rising class of
capitalists as the economically dominant group in society.20
An interesting feature of the model is that the same pattern of catch-up and overtaking
can also be generated in an environment where the investment technology is available
from the outset, instead of being introduced later on. If all dynasties start out suﬃciently
impatient, initially the investment technology is not used. Some dynasties, however, sort
into artisanship, and start to accumulate patience. After a few generations, the patience
of the artisans reaches a critical level, at which they start to use the investment technology
and turn into capitalists. In this version of the model, it is not the surprise appearance
of a new technology, but the endogenous accumulation of patience capital that triggers
the Industrial Revolution. Arguably, this sequence of events is closer in spirit to Weber’s
original hypothesis.
The outcome displayed in Figures III and IV is extreme in that two classes choose to
entirely exclude themselves from entrepreneurship, implying that wealth inequality grows
indeﬁnitely. Other long-run patterns are possible depending on the parameters of the
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production function. The robust prediction of the theory is that the most patient and
hard-working groups are the ﬁrst to make use of a new investment opportunity. Even if
the environment were such that ultimately even landowners invest, it is the middle class
that would get a head start and possibly overtake the landowning class in the process.
V Historical Evidence
In this section we document the basic historical facts underlying our theory, starting with
the social origin of the ﬁrst industrialists. In a study of founders of large industrial under-
takings in Britain between 1750 and 1850, Crouzet [1985, p. 68] concludes that “neither
the upper class nor the lower orders made a large contribution to the recruitment of indus-
trialists”. The only class that was signiﬁcantly over-represented among the industrialists
was the middle class.21 Similarly, Jeremy [1990, p. 347] documents that in a sample of
founders of large British businesses, among those born before 1870, the majority had “left
school in their mid-teens or earlier and then started to learn a trade, most frequently by an
apprenticeship”. The minor involvement of landowners not only in the establishment, but
also in the ﬁnancing of new enterprises is surprising, given the extreme concentration of
wealth in the hands of the landowning elite at the time. As late as 1880, fewer than 5000
landowners still owned more than 50 percent of all land (Cannadine [1990], see also Lindert
[1981, p. 378]). Commenting on the underrepresentation of the elite, Crouzet [1985, p. 70]
writes: “The contribution of that class to the industrial leadership is not proportionate to
its large share in the nation’s capital and income. Eric Richard has rightly asked of the
great landed families: ‘Why did they not do a great deal more in the Industrial Revolution?
After all, no class was better placed to beneﬁt from the transformation of the economy’ ”.
Even the already low estimate of the share of peers and gentry among the industrialists
overstates their true involvement in entrepreneurial activities. Landowners often became
involved simply by virtue of owning the land on which an industrial activity was to take
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place. In the majority of these cases, the aristocrats had no active entrepreneurial role.
“If they owned blast-furnaces, forges and other establishments, they tended to lease them
to tenants rather than to operate them through salaried managers . . . [They] were rather
passive lessors and investors than active business leaders” [Rubinstein, 1981, p. 68]. Some
became involved in the textile industries, but even those “were content to build—or help
to build—mills and to lease them out” [Rubinstein, 1981, p. 74]. Similarly, those who
became involved in the construction of mines and railways on their land usually insisted
on receiving regular periodical payments over the sums invested, without any commitment
to ﬁnancing the growth of the enterprises. From the 1880s, an increasing numbers of
aristocrats became board members of public companies. However, this step was taken only
by the poorer members of the upper class. “Apart from Rothschild and Glenconner, all
landowners who were company directors were indeed impoverished” [Cannadine, 1990, p.
406–409].
The new class of industrialists progressively replaced the landed elite as the economi-
cally dominant group in society, as reﬂected, with some lag, in the wealth distribution. In
the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century, large fortunes were still by and large associated with
land ownership. Rubinstein [1981] reports that among the 189 individuals who died be-
tween 1809 and 1858 with a fortune exceeding one million pounds, 95 percent were wealthy
landowners. However, merchants and industrial capitalists were already catching up. Lin-
dert [1986, Table 1] documents that in 1810 the average estate of living gentlemen was
more than three times larger than that of merchants and industrial capitalists, whereas in
1875 it was 16 percent smaller. Soon thereafter, landowners no longer featured prominently
among the wealthiest families in the country. Between 1900 and 1939, only 7 percent of
the 273 individuals who died as millionaires belonged to the landed elite [Rubinstein, 1981,
Tables 3.2 – 3.4]. Among the non-landed millionaires, about half of the new fortunes were
generated in the manufacturing sector, with most of the rest accounted for by commerce
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and ﬁnance. The old elite managed to preserve a signiﬁcant social and economic inﬂuence,
partly through intermarriage with the new industrial dynasties.22 Yet, the monopoly of
political and economic power that this small elite had enjoyed for centuries was never to
be restored.
Our theory attributes this transformation to class-speciﬁc preferences, which, in turn,
were shaped by the economic conditions in the pre-industrial period. Artisans and crafts-
men, the typical professions of the pre-industrial middle class, were required to make large
human capital investments, and consequently had steep lifetime income proﬁles. In most
of Europe, an artisan’s career advanced through three stages: apprenticeship, journeyman-
ship, and mastership.23 Apprenticeship would on average take ﬁve to six years, but in some
professions one would remain an apprentice for up to 12 years [Epstein, 1991]. After ap-
prenticeship, artisans would become journeymen and travel around European cities, serving
as employees at some master’s shop. This wandering period would last for a minimum of
three to four years [Friedrichs, 1995]. Savings and frugality were essential for journeymen
who hoped to become a master one day. “Unless he was able to count on substantial
inheritance or fortunate marriage, a journeyman’s primary interest was to amass capital
for opening their shop or business” [Epstein, 1991, p. 115]. Having completed his time
on the road, the journeyman could apply for admission to mastership, which was in itself
an expensive process.24 Only at that point, if successful, could the journeyman become a
master and a new guild member, and open a shop at his own expense.
In contrast, the age-earnings proﬁles of agricultural workers and landowners were rela-
tively ﬂat. Burnette [2006] documents that the wages of English farm workers in the early
nineteenth century varied little between the ages of 20 and 60. The landed gentry derived
its income mostly from owning land and, to a smaller extent, from mining projects [Beck-
ett, 1986]. Annual variation in a landowners’ income stems from two dominant sources:
ﬂuctuation in land rental rates, and changes in the size of the estate through land sales or
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purchases. While there were always some economically successful families who were able
to increase the size of their holdings, most aristocratic landowners merely aspired to pre-
serve the estate, so as to ultimately pass to the next generation just as much as they once
inherited. In periods of rising land rental rates, the income of landowners as a class would
increase as well; but given that, with few exceptions, rents tended to change only slowly
over time (at least until 1800), these movements would not generate the steep lifetime
income proﬁles that were typical for artisans and craftsmen.25
In our theory, diﬀerences in economic conditions ultimately manifest themselves in
class-speciﬁc preferences. And indeed, the stark contrast of the new entrepreneurs’ thrift
and work ethic with the landed aristocracy’s free-spending habits and leisurely lifestyle
has long been part of the conventional wisdom on the Industrial Revolution. The leisure
orientation of the pre-industrial upper class was in fact one of its deﬁning characteristics:
the term “gentleman” traditionally signiﬁed a man who did not need to work. “Wealth and
leisure allowed the aristocracy to develop a distinctive class culture that was reﬂected in the
clothes they wore, the food they ate, their manners . . . and above all in their recreations”
[Mate, 2006, p. 279]. Consistent with our theory, the aristocratic devotion to leisure grew
more sophisticated over time. The social “London Season” had its origin in the sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries and expanded to involving as many as 4000 families in
the late nineteenth century (see Cunningham [1990, p. 291]). The countryside also saw
an expanding range of leisure activities. Shooting, fox-hunting, and cricket all became
fashionable upper-class sports in the eighteenth century, while yachting grew popular in
the nineteenth century (see Beckett [1986, p. 236] and Cunningham [1990, p. 292]). The
available data show that the diﬀerences in work and leisure time between the upper and
lower classes were quantitatively large. Voth [2000, Tables 3.23 – 3.24] documents that in a
sample of Londoners in 1760 and 1800 the involvement of the elite in leisure activities was
three to ﬁve times as large as that of other social groups, whereas there were no signiﬁcant
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diﬀerences between the lower and the middle classes.
In contrast, the middle class developed a strict work ethic and a growing disdain for
leisure over time [Applebaum, 1992]. As pointed out by Weber, one source of this change
was the Protestant Reformation. Unlike in medieval Catholicism, the gloriﬁcation of God
no longer required a contemplative attitude or a praise of poverty. Rather, economic suc-
cess and an austere life became a way of glorifying God. “The summum bonum of this
ethic, the earning of more money, combined with the strict avoidance of all spontaneous
enjoyment of life . . . is devoided of any eudaemonistic . . . admixture” [Weber, 1905, p.
53]. Protestant values were also closely connected to the second element of our theory
of preference formation, namely, patience or thrift.26 Max Weber describes the eﬀects of
Puritan values on capital accumulation as follows: “When the limitation of consumption is
combined with this release of acquisitive activity, the inevitable practical result is obvious:
accumulation of capital through ascetic compulsion to save” [Weber, 1905, p. 172]. Reli-
gious fervor was not, however, the only source of changing attitudes. According to Perkin
[1969], after the Restoration of 1660 secular values such as social status and prestige also
became increasingly tied to wealth accumulation and economic success. The ﬁrst indus-
trialists were especially imbued with this new ethic of patience and hard work. “Almost
all major entrepreneurial ﬁgures took enormous risks, worked long and hard hours, and
rarely enjoyed the fruits of their eﬀorts until late in life” [Mokyr, 1999, p. 41]. Parsimony
was particularly important because a large share of the new enterprises relied on personal
savings and retained earnings to grow. “The early industrialists . . . lived very modestly,
spent only a fraction of their earnings for their households and put the rest back into the
business” [von Mises, 1963, p. 622].
To some extent, the reliance on retained earnings was feasible because, in most sectors,
capital needs were relatively low during the ﬁrst Industrial Revolution (see Mokyr [1999,
p. 96]. However, the shortfall of savings of the wealthy upper class has also been singled
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out as a contributing factor. For instance, Davis and Gallman [2001, p. 50] write: “It may
well have been true, as Postan noted, that at least two ﬁfteenth-century families could have
provided all the ﬁnance required to fund the entire Industrial Revolution. However, those
(and other elite) families chose not to redirect their existing portfolios to meet either the
relatively small demands of the manufacturing sector—demands that were met largely out
of retained earnings—or much more importantly, the demands for supporting investment
in infrastructure, particularly canal construction”.
The lack of industrial investment is only one indication of the low patience of the upper
class. If the members of the upper class were truly lacking in patience, they should have
been unwilling to invest in other kinds of ﬁnancial assets as well. The historical evidence
supports this implication. Well before the Industrial Revolution, the British government
became a major borrower, with multiple bond issues (mostly for war ﬁnance) throughout
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These bonds were mostly purchased by the urban
middle classes, whereas the contribution of the landed classes was insigniﬁcant [Dickson
1967, p. 302]. The ﬁnancing of early public companies follows the same pattern. Bowen
[1989, p. 195] documents that most stockholders of the East India Company between
1756 and 1791 were “clergymen, bankers, military and naval personnel, oﬃcials, brokers,
merchants large and small, and retailers,” whereas “beyond doubt there was no large-scale
investment in the Company by the landed interest or aristocracy”. The pre-industrial
elite thus played a surprisingly minor role in ﬁnancing government borrowing and private
enterprise well before the Industrial Revolution, despite being far wealthier than the middle
class. This stands in marked contrast to the wealth elites in modern industrial countries,
who generally own disproportionate shares of most types of assets, including government
debt and public stock (see Carroll [2001] for evidence on the United States).27
Rather than investing the rents derived from their estates, many landowners used their
land as collateral to borrow money. The scale of this borrowing substantially increased
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when long-term mortgage loans where introduced after the Glorious Revolution of 1688.
Beckett [1986, p. 300] reports that by the mid-eighteenth century “many families already
had an accumulation [of debt] several generations old”.28 Money was usually borrowed not
to ﬁnance improvement in existing estates or to buy more land, but to close the mismatch
between expenditure and income:29 “Rents and royalties were apparently being sucked
into conspicuous consumption and frittered away in spiraling marriage contracts; and the
gap between getting and spending was ﬁlled not by oﬄoading assets such as land, but by
borrowing from—in eﬀect—the commercial, industrial and shopkeeping members of the
populace” [Beckett 1986, p. 316] (See also Devine [1971], Porter [1982], and Kindleberger
[1993, p. 175]). Aristocratic indebtedness grew severely during the nineteenth century,
and in 1847 an observer claimed that “between half and two-thirds of English land was
encumbered (i.e. mortgaged)” [Beckett 1986, p. 315]. Cannadine [1994, p. 49] summa-
rizes the situation as follows: “Whatever might have been the ﬁnancial state of individual
families, it seems clear that the landed aristocracy as a class was in debt through the ﬁrst
three-quarters of the nineteenth century”.
Given our hypothesis of a low propensity to invest among the upper classes, one might
wonder why the aristocracy did not simply sell land to middle-class buyers. One reason is
that the land market in Britain was subject to pervasive legal restrictions that made selling
land costly or even impossible. Most large estates were entailed, meaning that they could
neither be split nor sold by the owner.30 Mortgaging their land to merchants and banks was
therefore the only way in which, de facto, many landowners could run down their assets.
Eventually, after statutory reforms and changes in the common law eased the restrictions
on land sales, many families overburdened by debt did sell oﬀ parts or all of their estates.
By that time, the economic problems of the upper classes—aggravated by falling land rents
after 1878—had become so pressing that land sales reached a massive scope. Cannadine
[1990, p. 89] summarizes the dismantling of aristocratic landownership during the ﬁrst
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part of the twentieth century as follows: “The scale of this territorial transfer was rivaled
only by two other landed revolutions in Britain this Millennium: The Norman Conquest
and the Dissolution of the Monasteries”. While other factors (taxation, decline of land
rents) contributed to this ﬁnal outcome, a clear thread links the chronic indebtedness of
the landed aristocracy over centuries with its eventual decline and inability to hold on to
the land.
Our theory predicts that the economic changes triggered by the Industrial Revolution
should feed back on preferences. Among the thriving bourgeoisie, we should observe an
increasing appreciation of leisure and ultimately a decline in economic success.31 Indeed,
social historians (see, e.g., Cunningham [1980]) document a surge in the demand for leisure
by the bourgeois middle class in the second half of the nineteenth century, reﬂecting a
waning of the austere values of the early days of industrialization: “At mid-century the
Victorian middle class had been suspicious of the moral temptations of a beckoning leisure
world, but had rapidly learned to assimilate it to their culture . . . By the end of the century
prescriptions had become more permissive—from ‘Be virtuous and you will be happy’ to
‘Be happy and you will be virtuous’—and middle class leisure grew more expansive and
assured” [Bailey, 1989, p. 110]. The changing preferences also aﬀected other spheres of
private and social life. To some extent, the appetite for consumption and leisure crowded
out religion, in line with Weber’s secularization hypothesis. Religious fervor, earlier a
deﬁning trait of the urban middle class, started fading in the second half of the century.
Activities competing with leisure such as daily family prayers declined: “Remaining in the
proper frame in mind . . . when the smell of bacon and coﬀee assailed one’s nose . . . was
too much for most of the younger generation and slowly the custom was shifted to once a
week on Sunday evenings, and, as leisure activities for all age groups grew more varied, was
ﬁnally abandoned” [Davidoﬀ, 1973, p. 35].32 The new material experience of the middle
class had ceased to be congruent with the rigid Puritan doctrine.
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The change of values also aﬀected the “industrial spirit,” which according to Wiener
[1981] started to decline after reaching its high-water mark with the Great Exhibition of
1851. At that time, many of the industrial dynasties underwent a process of gentriﬁcation
and absorbed some of the values of the landed elite. “Sometimes successful industrial-
ists left business altogether; other times they stayed in business, but viewed it ever more
as a social duty rather than an economic opportunity” [Wiener, 1981, p. 147]. Florence
[1953, p. 303, cited in Wiener[1981]] argues that for the hereditary manager “the pecuniary
incentive to large-scale expansion . . . may be weak, since the family are [sic] already well-
established. The transpecuniary objects are often stability and a conventional standard of
life with plenty of leisure and long weekends devoted to sports and other gentlemanly pur-
suits rather than making one’s way farther up the ladder”. Consistent with these changing
preferences, we observe a waning of entrepreneurial success among entrepreneurial dynas-
ties as family ﬁrms are passed on from the founding fathers to subsequent generations
(the “Buddenbrooks” eﬀect). In an empirical study of 1149 British business leaders born
between 1789 and 1937, Nicholas [1999b, p. 706–707] documents that “there is a compar-
atively low lifetime rate of wealth accumulation for ﬁrm inheritors. The older the dynasty,
the lower is the rate of return. Third-generation entrepreneurs clearly underperformed rel-
ative to ﬁrm founders or managers”. This observation is at odds with a purely genetic view
of entrepreneurial skills and preference transmission.33
VI Discussion of Alternative Hypotheses
The mechanism outlined in this paper is not the only possible explanation of the changing
fortunes of diﬀerent social classes throughout the Industrial Revolution. A ﬁrst alternative
hypothesis is that the relative decline of the aristocracy was driven by changes in the value
of land rather than the failure to embrace industrialization. Indeed, the crisis that started
in the late nineteenth century coincided with a period of rapidly falling land rents. However,
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viewed over the entire industrialization period, rents increased substantially—arguably an
eﬀect of the growth in industrial production and the associated population boom—and the
decline that occurred after 1878 only partially oﬀset the earlier run up.34 On the whole it
appears as if the evolution of rents over time may have ﬁrst delayed and then accelerated
the economic decline of the landowning class, rather than being its ultimate cause. More
generally, the robust prediction of our theory is a relative, but not necessarily absolute
economic decline. Consistent with this prediction, even during the period of rapidly rising
rents the wealth growth of the aristocracy did not keep pace with that of new industrialists
(as noted in the previous section).
Another hypothesis is that the upper classes were excluded from industrialization be-
cause urban workers possessed skills that were essential for industrial activities, while the
landowners did not. For certain sectors and activities, there is indeed evidence that prior
experience was important in determining who would become an entrepreneur.35 However,
when we consider the entire range of industrial activities the evidence suggests that dif-
ferences in skills cannot be the only or main explanation. A signiﬁcant share of the new
industrialists had not previously been involved in any form of manufacturing. For instance,
as many as 22 percent of the industrialists’ fathers were yeomen and farmers, groups with
no experience in industrial activity Crouzet [1985, Table 8]. Moreover, there is evidence
of substantial mobility across industrial sectors. Crouzet reports that no more than 40
percent of the fathers of the industrialists in his sample worked either in the same industry
or in an industry or trade with forward or backward linkages with the branch in which they
set up. Landowners were therefore not at a particular disadvantage in terms of their skills
relative to many of the middle-class entrepreneurs. In fact, a number of key sectors during
industrialization (such as mining, railways, and canals) required land as a major input. In
these sectors, if anything, the landowners should have had an advantage over middle-class
city dwellers.
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A related argument is that the landowners, busy managing their rural estates, may have
lacked the time and opportunity to enter industrial activities, which mostly took place in
or near cities. However, many landowners did not actively manage their estates. Even
more telling, it was not only the heirs of estates who shunned business activity; second
and third sons of landowners did so as well. These younger sons had no choice but to
enter some activity other than landowning, and were therefore not held back by their
obligations to an existing estate. Nevertheless, they did not enter business in any larger
numbers than their landowning fathers. For instance, consider Table II, which reports
the occupational choices of Cambridge graduates during the period 1750–1899. The vast
majority of students at Cambridge during this period were sons of the landowning class, so
their occupational choices (other than landowning) give us some idea of which professions
younger sons entered.36 Strikingly, until 1850, not a single graduate got involved in banking
or business (widely deﬁned as any “proﬁt-oriented activity”), and even after 1850 the
percentage remains surprisingly low. This evidence is corroborated by the study of Crouzet
[1985], who documents that few of the new industrialists’ fathers were landowners (see
footnote 21).
The arguments discussed so far do not rely on group-speciﬁc preferences. We now
turn to explanations that do involve heterogeneity in preferences, but of a diﬀerent nature
than in our model. Cain and Hopkins [1993, p. 23] argue that a social norm against the
involvement in entrepreneurial activities excluded the British aristocracy from industrial
capitalism: “A gentleman required income, and preferably sizeable wealth, but was not
to be sullied by the acquisitive process”. To the extent to which this exclusion was a
matter of personal preference and (possibly acquired) taste, this thesis coincides with our
explanation. However, as the classical theory of Veblen [1899] suggests, social norms may
have also served as an instrument of social exclusion. A gentleman violating the norm would
lose the recognition of his peers, with potentially grave consequences for social standing and
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access to aristocratic privileges. In this case, the enforcement would be partly extrinsic:
even a gentleman enjoying hard work in principle may prefer to shun work in practice
to avoid social sanctions. Interestingly, Veblen argued that the emphasis on leisure and
reﬁned tastes became a natural instrument of social exclusion precisely because the income
process of the aristocrats granted them abundant free time, whereas members of other
classes had no choice but to work: “Abstention from labour is the conventional evidence of
wealth and is therefore the conventional mark of social standing; and this insistence on the
meritoriousness of wealth leads to a more strenuous insistence on leisure” [Veblen, 1899,
p. 26]. Thus, the social norm may have its roots in the same economic conditions that
generate class-speciﬁc preferences in our theory.
The individual-preference and the social-norm approaches share many predictions for
individual behavior, making it diﬃcult to discriminate the two models empirically. One
indication for the importance of individual preferences is that the “gentlemanly values”
of the upper class persisted even after the aristocracy lost its predominance. If social
norms had no function other than serving as an instrument of social exclusion, we would
expect these norms to disappear once aristocratic privileges lost their value. The historical
evidence suggests that aristocratic norms not only persisted, but even spread to other
social classes throughout the nineteenth century.37 This observation is inconsistent with an
explanation for class-speciﬁc preferences based on social exclusion alone, because members
of lower classes could not have gained access to social and economic privileges by merely
imitating the tastes of the upper class.38
Perkin [1969] and Mokyr [1999] take the argument one step further and argue that ac-
quiring gentlemanly status was an end to itself. In this view, both the initial accumulation
of wealth and the later increase in leisure and ostentatious consumption can be interpreted
as means to the end of ﬁrst acquiring and later displaying social status. As in our inter-
pretation, the economic slowdown of the industrial dynasties is a conscious choice, albeit
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for a diﬀerent reason. While in our theory the increase in leisure is driven by a change
in preferences, in Perkin and Mokyr it is part of the aristocratic ideal to which they had
always aspired.
A last possibility is that aspects of preferences other than patience and leisure appre-
ciation were driving the economic decisions of diﬀerent social classes during the Industrial
Revolution. For example, risk aversion or attitudes towards innovation may have also
been relevant for the emergence of a spirit of capitalism, although these traits would apply
mainly to entrepreneurship narrowly conceived rather than to the general attitude towards
investments. Extending the analysis to these additional aspects of preferences may provide
further insights. For instance, similar to the case of patience, ﬁnancial development would
tend to equalize the attitudes towards risk across dynasties engaged in diﬀerent profes-
sions. However, it may induce parents to encourage risk-taking behavior in their children,
contrary to the analysis of patience in this paper, where ﬁnancial development reduces the
incentive to invest in patience.
VII Conclusions
The modern theory of economic growth focuses on changes in material conditions and stan-
dards of living, while ignoring, with few exceptions, the role of culture. This approach is
legitimate as long as culture, while possibly being shaped by economic conditions, does not
feed back into economic decisions. Recently, however, a number of economists have uncov-
ered growing evidence that preferences, culture, and religion are important determinants
of economic decisions and outcomes.
In this paper, we have developed a theory where economic conditions and culture are
mutually interlinked. The theory can account for a number of observations about the
British Industrial Revolution, such as the emergence of a spirit of capitalism among the
urban middle class, as well as the subsequent replacement of the landed aristocracy by
40
industrial capitalists as the socioeconomic elite. Consistent with evidence provided by
social historians, the theory also predicts that the economic success of the bourgeoisie
should ultimately lead to a cultural transformation of this class.
The theory shows that stratiﬁcation of preferences across occupations may occur even
in an initially homogeneous society. In reality, historical accidents may have fostered the
stratiﬁcation process. For instance, the political and religious forces behind the success
of the Protestant Reformation may have contributed to the formation and transmission
of preferences conducive to hard work and wealth accumulation. Likewise, demographic
changes such as increasing longevity may have also played a role. A longer life horizon would
tend to increase an agent’s propensity to accumulate human capital and material wealth,
reinforcing the eﬀects of technological shocks at the time of the Industrial Revolution.
Although the analysis targets a speciﬁc historical episode, we expect the theory de-
veloped in this paper to be applicable to other open questions in macroeconomics and
economic growth. For instance, a recent macroeconomic literature argues that preference
heterogeneity is key for explaining portfolio choices and the dynamics of the wealth distri-
bution in modern economies.39 Our theory provides a new mechanism for the emergence
and transmission of heterogeneous preferences. The theory also oﬀers a new perspective on
the impact of ﬁnancial development on economic development. These and other aspects of
endogenous preference formation are left to future research.
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Table I
Parameter Values for Simulated Economy
Parameter Interpretation Value
z Intergenerational Altruism 0.5
A¯ Natural Taste for Leisure 1.0
φA Level Parameter for Taste for Leisure 1.5
ξA Curvature Parameter for Taste for Leisure 0.5
B¯ Natural Patience 0.4
φB Level Parameter for Patience 0.66
ξB Curvature Parameter for Patience 0.5
ψ Depreciation of Preferences 0.5
γ Steepness of Artisan Income Proﬁle 2.0
R Minimum Return of Capitalist Technology 0.35
R Maximum Return of Capitalist Technology 0.42
η Elasticity of Entrepreneurial Return 0.5
δ Depreciation of Capital 0.2
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Table II
Professional Choices of Cambridge Graduates, in Percent
1752–1799 1800–1849 1850–1899
Church 60 62 38
Land-Owning 14 14 7
Teaching 9 9 12
Law 6 9 14
Administration 3 1 6
Medicine 1 2 7
Banking 0 0 2
Business 0 0 5
Other 7 3 9
Source: Jenkins and Jones [1950, Table 1]
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Figure I
The Timing of Preference Formation and Labor Supply
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Figure II
The Value Function for Patience vB(B) and Policy Function lB(B) for Investing in
Patience
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Figure III
Capital Accumulation and the Evolution of Patience After the Introduction of a
Capitalist Technology
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Figure IV
The Evolution of the Taste for Leisure After the Introduction of a Capitalist Technology
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Notes
1. Adam Smith [1776, p. 432] writes, for instance: “A merchant is accustomed to employ his money
chieﬂy in proﬁtable projects; whereas a mere country gentleman is accustomed to employ it chieﬂy in
expense. The one often sees his money go from him and return to him again with a proﬁt: the other, when
once he parts with it, very seldom expects to see any more of it”. In a study of early industrialists, Crouzet
[1985, p. 37] cites accounts of the time relating that Mancunian manufacturers of the late eighteenth
century “. . . commenced their careers in business with but slender capitals. . . . Patience, industry and
perseverance was their principal stock”.
2. Although his work focuses mainly on the eﬀects of culture on economic outcomes, Weber acknowl-
edged the possibility of a two-way relationship and suggested, for instance, that religious factors may
themselves be inﬂuenced by economic conditions: “It would also further be necessary to investigate how
Protestant Asceticism was in turn inﬂuenced in its development and its character by the totality of social
conditions, especially economic . . . it is, of course, not my aim to substitute for a one-sided materialistic
an equally one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and of history” [Weber, 1905, p. 183].
3. This echoes Weber’s discussion of the secularizing inﬂuence of wealth. Citing John Wesley, he writes:
“Religion must necessarily produce both industry and frugality, and these cannot but produce riches. But
as riches increase, so will . . . the love of the world in all its branches . . . Although the form of religion
remains, the spirit is swiftly vanishing away” [Weber, 1905, p. 175].
4. According to the calibration analysis of Cavalcanti, Parente, and Zhao [2007], diﬀerences in religious
aﬃliation can explain some of the diﬀerences in the timing and diﬀusion of the Industrial Revolution across
countries.
5. Also related are Mulligan [1997], where parents choose their own level of altruism towards their
children, and Haaparanta and Puhakka [2004], where agents invest in their own patience and in health.
Lindbeck and Nyberg [2006] focus on the negative eﬀects of public transfers on parents’ incentives to instill
a work ethic in their children. Krusell and Stavlo¨t [2005] analyze the accumulation of a taste for culture
consumption, and ﬁnd that complementarities between current and future culture consumption can lead
to multiplicity of steady states. The macroeconomic consequences of inherited (as opposed to chosen)
preferences have been examined by de la Croix and Michel [1999, 2001] and Alonso-Carrera, Caballe´, and
Raurich [2007]. In Artige, Camacho, and de la Croix [2004], inherited consumption habits can lead to the
downfall of a temporarily wealthy country or region.
6. Other evidence of a positive correlation between steep income proﬁles and patience includes Carroll
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and Summers [1991] who document that in both Japan and the United States consumption-age proﬁles
are steeper when economic growth is high, and Becker and Mulligan [1997], who show that consumption
growth is high for adults who either have income themselves (which is associated with steep income proﬁles)
or who had rich parents.
7. See in particular Heckman [2000] and Carneiro and Heckman [2003], who review the evidence from
a large number of programs targeting disadvantaged children. Similar conclusions are reached by studies in
child development psychology such as Shonkoﬀ and Philips [2000] and Taylor, McGue, and Iacono [2000].
Dohmen et al. [2006] document evidence (based on the German Socio-Economic Panel) that trust and risk
attitudes are transmitted from parents to children.
8. Formally, we only model parental investments in a child’s taste for leisure; a parent who wishes to
improve a child’s work ethic would simply do little or none of this investment.
9. Note that discounting across generations is not a choice variable and depends on the exogenous
altruism parameter z. It could be argued that investments in patience also aﬀect altruism (i.e., z may be
endogenous). Such a model would lead to qualitatively similar results, but the change would come at the
cost of a loss of analytical tractability.
10. The additive separability of the value function hinges on logarithmic utility. Since logarithmic
utility is a common assumption in problems with endogenous labor supply, our analysis provides a useful
tractable benchmark. The solution can be characterized under more general preferences if one abstracts
from investment in the taste for leisure, see Doepke and Zilibotti [2005].
11. If the production function for patience f(lB) is linear, in knife-edge economies (i.e., in a zero-
measure subset of the parameter space) the policy correspondence is not single-valued even between steps.
Convergence in terms of occupational choice is still guaranteed, but dynasties may be indiﬀerent between
multiple patience levels. In generic economies, lB(B) is single valued even in the linear case.
12. It is not necessary, however, to assume the complete absence of ﬁnancial markets, as we do for
analytical convenience. As long as the steepness of an income proﬁle is at least partially transmitted to
utility proﬁles, the basic mechanism is at work. The assumption of complete ﬁnancial markets is routinely
rejected even in contemporary data from industrial economies, see, e.g., Card, Chetty, and Weber [2007].
13. For example, although engaging in a lengthy program of study (such as medical school) that leads
to high future incomes may still require some patience and perseverance, today’s students have access to
educational loans and credit cards. Hence, the modern-day artisans are able to consume some of their
future rewards already in the present, and consequently they (and their parents) face a smaller incentive
to invest in specialized preferences.
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14. This focus is consistent with the observation that factor prices varied little in the pre-industrial
economy. Clark [2007, Figure 9.4] shows that the wage of craftsmen relative to laborers in Britain were
about constant between 1400 and 1800. During the same period, land rents were a roughly constant share
of income [Clark, 2007, Figure 7.4].
15. An equilibrium with constant wages only exist for a subset of the admissible parameter set. A set
of suﬃcient conditions is provided in the online technical appendix.
16. This is consistent with the evidence presented by Voth [2000], who documents that the number of
hours worked by workers and artisans in the pre-industrial era were approximately the same. See also the
discussion in Section V.
17. Dynastic enterprises were common in the early days of the Industrial Revolution. Caselli and
Gennaioli [2003] link this observation to the underdevelopment of ﬁnancial markets: it was unproﬁtable
for parents to liquidate their business instead of leaving it to the children. In our model, the irreversibility
constraint implies that diﬀerences in investment across families lead to diﬀerent initial assets for the next
generation. Under reversible investment, similar results could be obtained if the altruism parameter z (the
intergenerational discount factor) was an increasing function of patience B (the intragenerational discount
factor).
18. The curvature in the return function is not essential for the results, but is useful to generate a
smooth relationship between state variables and the entrepreneurial return in the simulations below.
19. In principle, parents could bequeath additional resources to their oﬀspring. However, we focus on
economies where the irreversibility of the capital stock is a binding constraint for the old adults. Namely,
in the last period of their lives agents would like to liquidate part of the capital stock and consume it,
but they are instead forced to leave it to their children as an involuntary bequest. Agents clearly do not
leave any additional bequests in such economies. Formally, this outcome can be guaranteed by choosing
the altruism factor z appropriately.
20. In the model, all landowners are identical, so that there is not a single landowning investor. The
separation of classes is less sharp if one adds preference shocks to the model. Then a few patient landowners
can emerge who decide to utilize the new accumulation opportunity. These landowners would become quite
rich, since they can earn income from both the industry and agriculture.
21. In the sample analyzed in this study, only 2.3 percent of the industrialists came from peerage and
gentry [Crouzet, 1985, Table 5]. In contrast, 85 percent of the new industrialists had a middle-class
background, with almost half of them coming from low-middle-class families, such as “shopkeepers, self-
employed craftsmen and artisans, cultivators of various kind” [Crouzet, 1985, p. 127]. Although the upper
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class was a small group to begin with, the representation of the middle class was higher than that of the
upper class even as a proportion of their share in the population. At the beginning of the nineteenth
century, peerage and gentry accounted for about 1.4 percent of the population, while the middle class
made up slightly less than 30 percent.
22. Clark [2007, ch. 15] documents the story of the Sassoon family, whose founding member, David
Sassoon, was a Sephardic Jew merchant born in Baghdad in 1792. By the 1880s the family had established
several global enterprises, invested in India and China, and by the 1920s it owned more than one-tenth of
the Bombay cotton industry. Several members of the family moved to England and were absorbed into the
English aristocracy through marriages. See also Cannadine [1990, p. 347]
23. The life of an apprentice was not glamorous. “Upon payment of a placement fee, apprentices took
their place in their master’s household, agreeing to obey and respect him as a father. . . . Not all apprentices
reached mastership, but this does not gainsay the fact that the purpose of apprenticeship was selection
and the goal a direct route to mastership” [Farr, 2000, p. 33].
24. The applicants owed the payment of a series of fees, the completion of a masterpiece according to
the guild regulations, and the outlay (if the masterpiece was accepted) for a luxurious banquet for the
masters he hoped to join. In addition, he had to submit the name of a proposed bride, whom the guild was
supposed to examine and approve. See Phelps Brown and Hopkins [1957], Farr [2000] and Munro [2004]
for additional evidence.
25. Real rents per acre in England were roughly constant between 1300 and 1600. In the early sev-
enteenth century, real rents increased sharply, and then leveled oﬀ again until 1800 [Clark, 2007, Figure
14.2]. In principle, a ﬂat proﬁle for overall family income need not imply that individual consumption
proﬁles were ﬂat as well. In particular, one might imagine that aristocrats started to consume heavily
only after inheriting their estates, while living frugally during their younger years. However, the avail-
able evidence suggests that, if anything, the opposite was true. Young aristocrats typically did not work
during their childhood and young adulthood and were supported by their parents. These family support
payments tended to be large, and contributed to aristocratic indebtedness: “family payments were not the
only cause of aristocratic indebtedness, but contemporaries usually regard them as playing a crucial role”
[Beckett, 1986, p. 298]. Thus, aristocrats usually lived in some comfort during their entire lives and did
not experience the stark contrast of a sober adolescence with relative prosperity during adulthood that
was typical for urban artisans and craftsmen.
26. Work ethic and patience are important not only for investments but also for innovation, as witnessed
by Edison’s famous statement that invention is one percent of inspiration and ninety-nine percent of
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perspiration. Mokyr [1990, p. 241] argues that pre-industrial Britain beneﬁted from the arrival of skilled
workers ﬂeeing anti-Protestant prosecution in France. Our theory suggests that this exodus may have
fostered both the entrepreneurial spirit and the innovative capability that later on fueled the Industrial
Revolution in Britain.
27. Notice that our theory does not posit that landowners were always impatient; in fact, the ﬁrst
aristocrats in a dynasty, who initially acquired title and estate, may have plausibly been particularly
patient.
28. See also Temin and Voth [2007].
29. Thompson [1994] documents that ever since 1700, the landowners progressively withdrew from day-
to-day involvement in the management of their estates. The investments and technical innovations in
agriculture during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, which played an important role in the
British Industrial Revolution, were carried out almost entirely by tenant farmers. According to Cannadine
[1994, p. 48–49], most debt was taken on with the objective of “the enhancement of the social prestige
and the fulﬁllment of the traditional responsibilities of the landowner. . . . To the extent that such self-
indulgent activities were ﬁnanced from middle- and working-class savings, . . . this deﬁnitely amounted to
a ‘haemorrhage of capital,’ a ‘misallocation of resources,’ as funds from urban and industrial Britain were
diverted to underpin the indulgence of the landed order”.
30. Through the institution of entail, an aristocratic landowner could prevent his descendants from
selling part or all of the estate.
31. It should be noted, however, that our theory does not imply that the gentriﬁed middle class will
ultimately resemble the landed elite in all dimensions. In particular, unlike investing in the work ethic,
the accumulation of patience is self-reinforcing over time and may lead to persistent cultural and economic
diﬀerences between the classes. As in the example discussed in Section IV.B, industrial dynasties may
continue to accumulate wealth, albeit at a lower rate, once the switch from work ethic to a heightened
appreciation of leisure has taken place.
32. Obelkevich [1990, p. 338–346] summarizes the changing attitude of the middle class towards religious
values as follows: ”It was in the middle classes that the Victorian religious boom had the biggest impact
. . . In the 1870s the ﬁrst signs appeared that the long period of growth was coming to an end. Though
membership was still increasing, it failed to keep pace with the growth in the population, and church going
actually began to decline: in middle-class districts in London attendance fell by more than a third between
1886 and 1902. Such hallmarks of Victorian religiosity as strict Sunday observance and family prayers were
being abandoned . . . Behind the statistics of falling attendances lay a deeper disaﬀection from the churches
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and their messages”. The same author documents how the diﬀerent churches responded by softening their
message and precepts.
33. The decline in the spirit of capitalism within industrial dynasties had already stricken contemporary
observers. For instance, Alfred Marshall [1890, p. 299–300] writes: “It would . . . at ﬁrst sight seem likely
that business men should constitute a sort of caste; . . . But the actual state of things is very diﬀerent.
. . . [W]hen a man has got together a great business, his descendants often fail, in spite of their great
advantage, to develop the high abilities and special turn of mind and temperament required for carrying it
on with equal success. . . . When a full generation has passed . . . then the business almost invariably falls
to pieces”. A related argument is the “Carnegie conjecture,” i.e., Andrew Carnegie’s [1891] assertion that
wealth “deadens the talents and energies” of children. Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen [1993] provide
evidence from the PSID that inherited wealth depresses labor supply. This is consistent with our model.
34. According to Turner, Beckett, and Afton [1997, Table A2.1], rents per acre tripled between 1790
and 1878 and fell by 27 percent between 1878 and 1910. Within the period, there were sharp increases
between 1790–1815 (124 percent) and 1850–1878 (37 percent) and a period of ﬂat rents in between. Clark
[2007, Figure 14.2], who focuses on real rents per acre for farmland, reports a less pronounced increase
and a sharper fall after 1878. Nevertheless, the overall pattern is the same. One important factor that is
associated with the evolution of land rents is the introduction of the Corn Laws in 1815 and their ultimate
repeal in 1846. The eﬀect of the Corn Laws on rents is controversial, though. For instance, Moore [1965]
argues that they were not particularly eﬀective in sustaining high agricultural prices. After the repeal of
the Corn Laws, grain imports gradually increased, but rents actually increased over the following thirty
years.
35. Skills and experience in related activities were particularly important in the textile industry (see
Crouzet [1985, p. 116–125, and also footnote 79, p. 206]).
36. One group missing here is those choosing the military career, who would attend a military academy
instead of Oxford or Cambridge.
37. When Britain went into economic decline relative to competitors such as Germany and the United
States after 1870, much of the blame was placed on the British education system (in particular the public
schools and Oxbridge) for spreading aristocratic anti-business and anti-industrial attitudes to the upper
middle classes; see the extensive discussion in Rubinstein [1993].
38. While the industrial elite ultimately started to appreciate leisure, for the most part it did not acquire
the main prerequisite of aristocratic privilege, i.e., land. For instance, Nicholas [1999a] notes that “those
who made fortunes in business . . . did not purchase or inherit land on large scale. This was despite the fact
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that their wealth gave them an unprecedented opportunity for land acquisition.” Indeed, many preferred
renting land for their leisure’s sake, but did not bother with buying it. This suggests that leisure had
intrinsic appeal to them, rather than being enjoyed solely for the purpose of social advancement (see also
Rubinstein [1981, 1996]).
39. See Krusell and Smith, Jr. [1998], Browning, Hansen, and Heckman [1999], and Ameriks, Caplin,
and Leahy [2003].
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